Identification of an Implicit Price Agreement on the Food Market
Abstract
The article analyzes current approaches to detecting an implicit price collusion in the market. A group of factors is singled out, a simultaneous combination of which may indicate a possible price collusion: firstly, a significant share of the market under investigation belongs to companies that have a high degree of correlative dependence of financial and economic indicators, and secondly, the high degree of affiliation of market participants. The results of checking these regularities are presented on the example of the wholesale market of sugar in Russia, where the FAS confirm the existence of a price collusion. The analysis of meat industry of Novosibirsk and Tomsk region is conducted, the results of which allow estimating the probability of existence of price collusion.
About the Authors
P. N. Likhutin
Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Likhutin Pavel N. - PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Department of Corporate Governance and Finance
A. A. Daryina
Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Daryina Anna A. - Associate, Department of Corporate Governance and Finance
V. V. Zasseeva
Novosibirsk State University of Economics and Management
Russian Federation
Russian Federation
Zasseeva Valeriya V. - Associate, Department of Corporate Governance and Finance
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Review
For citations:
Likhutin P.N., Daryina A.A., Zasseeva V.V. Identification of an Implicit Price Agreement on the Food Market. Vestnik NSUEM. 2018;(1):103-121. (In Russ.)
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