The Limit of Russian State Capitalism
https://doi.org/10.34020/2073-6495-2020-3-260-276
Abstract
The purpose of the work is to identify the conditions for the formation of the limit of Russian state capitalism. The study is based on a systematic approach using methods of statistical, cluster and neural network analysis. The article reflects the connection between the limit of Russian state capitalism and the structure of the Russian economy and the exhaustion of the possibilities of its development as a whole. Russia merges industrial capital with banking at the level of state monopolies, forming imperialist capitalism. As a result of the assessment of the dynamics of generalizing indicators of the activities of organizations and the boundaries of the existence of households, the conditions for the formation of the limit of Russian state capitalism in the form of a prerequisites and a base are revealed. The study revealed that the growth rate of the total profit received by existing credit organizations is not determined by the growth rate of return on assets, profitability of goods, products, works, services sold, autonomy coefficient, but, to a greater extent, is associated with the growth rate of money supply. The increase in the growth rate of the amount of subsidies accrued to the population for payment of housing and utilities is due to the lag in the dynamics of the decline in the number of people with cash incomes below the subsistence minimum compared to the growth rate of the number of families receiving subsidies for housing and utilities. The research results expand the scope of knowledge and form new competencies of state authorities for making managerial decisions to maintain a stable position and image of Russia in the globalization process. The conditions for the formation of the limit of Russian state capitalism are: the prerequisites – the devaluation of the national currency, targeted state assistance to state enterprises during the crisis and the withdrawal of capital during the period of stable economic growth; the base – the need to increase the growth rate of the amount of subsidies accrued to the population for housing and utilities.
About the Author
V. V. SmirnovRussian Federation
Smirnov Valeriy V., PhD in Economics, Associate Professor, Department of Sectoral Economics
Cheboksary
References
1. Alexakis P.D., Samantas I.G. Foreign ownership and market power: The special case of European banks // Journal of Banking & Finance. 2020. Vol. 118. Article 105857.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105857
2. Boubakri N., Ghoul S.E., Guedhami O., Hossain M. Post-privatization state ownership and bank risk-taking: Cross-country evidence // Journal of Corporate Finance. 2020. Vol. 64. Article 101625. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101625
3. Bolgorian M., Mayeli A. Banks’ characteristics, state ownership and vulnerability to sanctions: Evidences from Iran. Borsa Istanbul Review. 2019. Vol. 19. Iss. 3. P. 264–272. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bir.2019.02.003
4. Cao X., Cumming D., Zhou S. State ownership and corporate innovative efficiency. Emerging Markets Review. In press, corrected proof. Available online 5 May 2020. Article 100699. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2020.100699
5. Chang S.-C., Boontham W. Post-privatization speed of state ownership relinquishment: Determinants and influence on firm performance // The North American Journal of Economics and Finance. 2017. Vol. 41. P. 82–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2017.04.001
6. Cosset J.-C., Durnev A., Oliveira dos Santos I. Privatization and state ownership of natural advantage industries . The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 2020. Vol. 76. P. 68–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2019.08.005
7. Ding M., Suardi S. Government ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from China. Emerging Markets Review. 2019. Vol. 40. Article 100625. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ememar.2019.100625
8. Dong Y., Liu Z., Shen Z., Sun Q. Does State Ownership Really Matter in Determining Access to Bank Loans? Evidence from China’s Partial Privatization // Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 2016. Vol. 40. Part A. P. 73–85. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2016.09.001
9. Fornaro P., Luomaranta H. Aggregate fluctuations and the effect of large corporations: Evidence from Finnish monthly data. Economic Modelling. 2018. Vol. 70. P. 245–258. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2017.11.012
10. Ge Y., Liu Y., Qiao Z., Shen Z. State ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from corporate bond issuances in China. Research in International Business and Finance. 2020. Vol. 52. Article 101164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2019.101164
11. Gu L., Ni X., Peng Y., Zhang H. Entry of foreign banks, state ownership, and corporate innovation // Pacific-Basin Finance Journal. 2020. Vol. 61. Article 101340. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101340
12. Huang Y., Xie E., Li Y., Reddy K.S. Does state ownership facilitate outward FDI of Chinese SOEs? Institutional development, market competition, and the logic of interdependence between governments and SOEs. International Business Review. 2017. Vol. 26. Iss. 1. P. 176–188. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2016.06.005
13. Kubo K., Phan H.V. State ownership, sovereign wealth fund and their effects on firm performance: Empirical evidence from Vietnam // Pacific-Basin Finance Journal.2019. Vol. 58. Article 101220. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2019.101220
14. Li S., Fu H., Wen J., Chang C.-P. Separation of ownership and control for Chinese listed firms: Effect on the cost of debt and the moderating role of bank competition. Journal of Asian Economics. 2020. Vol. 67. Article 101179. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2020.101179
15. Li H. Residual state ownership and stock market integration: Evidence from Chinese partly-privatised firms. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 2018. Vol. 67. P. 100–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2017.05.004
16. Li L., McMurray A., Sy M., Xue J. Corporate ownership, efficiency and performance under state capitalism: Evidence from China // Journal of Policy Modeling. 2018. Vol. 40. Iss. 4. P. 747–766. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2018.03.002
17. Lin H., He Y., Wang M., Huang Y. The State-Owned Capital Gains Handover System and managerial agency cost: Evidence from central state-owned listed companies in China. Finance Research Letters. In press, corrected proof. Available online 14 October 2019. Article 101325. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2019.101325
18. Noring L. Public asset corporation: A new vehicle for urban regeneration and infrastructure finance. Cities. 2019. Vol. 88. P. 125–135. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2019.01.002
19. Pak O. The impact of state ownership and business models on bank stability: Empirical evidence from the Eurasian Economic Union. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. 2019. Vol. 71. P. 161–175. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2018.07.008
20. Ren M., Manning S., Vavilov S. Does state ownership really matter? The dynamic alignment of China’s resource environment and firm internationalization strategies // Journal of International Management. 2019. Vol. 25. Iss. 3. Article 100667. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intman.2019.02.001
21. Stowell D.P. Chapter 18: Private Equity Impact on Corporations. Investment Banks, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity (Third Edition). 2018. P. 393-418. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804723-1.00018-9
22. Vo X.V. Do firms with state ownership in transitional economies take more risk? Evidence from Vietnam. Research in International Business and Finance. 2018. Vol. 46. P. 251–256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.03.002
23. Wiig A., Kolstad I. Multinational corporations and host country institutions: A case study of CSR activities in Angola. International Business Review. 2010. Vol. 19. Iss. 2. P. 178–190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2009.11.006
24. Xie F., Anderson H.D., Chi J., Liao J. Does residual state ownership increase stock return volatility? Evidence from China’s secondary privatization // Journal of Banking & Finance. 2019. Vol. 100. P. 234-251. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.01.012
25. Yeddou N., Pourroy M. Bank liquidity creation: Does ownership structure matter? The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance. In press, corrected proof. Available online 22 January 2020. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2020.01.003
26. Yi J., Hong J., Hsu W.C., Wang C. Reprint of «The role of state ownership and institutions in the innovation performance of emerging market enterprises: Evidence from China». Technovation. 2020. Vol. 94–95. Article 102095. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.technovation.2019.102095
27. Zhang X., Yu M., Chen G. Does mixed-ownership reform improve SOEs’ innovation? Evidence from state ownership. China Economic Review. 2020. Vol. 61. Article 101450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2020.101450
28. Zhang S., Liu C. State ownership and the structuring of lease arrangements. Journal of Corporate Finance. 2020. Vol. 62. Article 101597. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101597
Review
For citations:
Smirnov V.V. The Limit of Russian State Capitalism. Vestnik NSUEM. 2020;(3):260-276. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.34020/2073-6495-2020-3-260-276