Communal Property as a Reservation for Entrepreneurs in the Digitized Harberger System. Prospects for Maintaining Control

The purpose of the article is to study changes in business activity after the complete digitalization of economic activity and the introduction of the A. Harberger system. The article uses the methodology of the theory of inventive problem solving, which is used to assess the consequences of digitalization of property relations and the introduction of the A. Harberger system. According to this theory, all objects of business property are divided into such elements as «engine», «working body», «transmission», «computer», «energy source». It is argued that as a result of digitalization, these elements will gain independ ence and flexibility of combination. In this case, the «calculator» will be the dominant and most expensive element. The introduction of the A. Harberger System will make it necessary to minimize the cost of it by providing access to it for all economic entities. As a result of these processes, all profit – making technologies become well-known, and business property objects become publicly available.As a result, business activity will continue only in those segments of the economy that can function without the participation of the computer and where it is possible to use a communal form of ownership.The main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used to develop measures to maintain business activity in the new conditions. In order to maintain business activity, it is proposed to create internal communal offshore companies, whose residents will enjoy special taxation and property administration regimes. The article substantiates the possibility of maintaining tax control over them using quantitative dependencies between different functional levels of business activity.

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